Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
1992

Scientific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions
Paul C. Giannelli
Case Western University School of Law, paul.giannelli@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Repository Citation
Giannelli, Paul C., "Scientific Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions" (1992). Faculty Publications. 294.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/294

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

THE TWENTY-FffiST ANNUAL
KENNETH J. HODSON LECTURE
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS*
PAUL

C.

GIANNELLI**

It is an honor to have been invited to give the Kenneth J.
Hodson Lecture in Criminal Law. I had the privilege of serving
l.mder General Hodson while on active duty. My talk today is about
scientific evidence, and it is based on my research in this area.

I. Increased Use of Scientific Evidence
Scientific and expert evidence is playing an ever-increasing
and far more important role in criminal prosecutions than in the
past.

A. Notorious Trials

A quick look at well-publicized trials over the past decade
illustrates this point. In his book on the Claus von Bulow
prosecution, Alan Dershowitz wrote, "At bottom the case against
Claus von Bulow was a scientific case. It would have to be refuted
by scientific evidence."l Similarly, the trial of Ted Bundy, the serial
killer, involved the use of hypnotically-refreshed testimony and bite
mark evidence.z Fiber evidence proved critical in the trial of Wayne
Williams for the murder of two of the thirty young black males
killed in Atlanta in the late 1970's. 3 Pathology and serology
*This article is a transcript of a lecture delivered by the author to members
of the Staff and Faculty, their distinguished guests, and officers attending the
40th Graduate Course and the 127th Judge Advocate Officers Basic Course, at
The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, on March 26,
1992. The Kenneth J. Hodson Chair of Criminal Law was established on June 24,
1971. Major General Hodson was The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, from
1967 to 1971, and was a member of the original Staff and Faculty of The Judge
Advocate General's School at Charlottesville, Virginia.
**Albert J. Weatherhead Ill and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1A. DERSHOWlTZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INsiDE THE VON BULOW CASE 105
(1986); see also State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875
(1984).
2
Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18-19 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894
(1986); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 348 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109
(1986); see also R. LARsEN, BUNDY: THE DELmERATE STRANGER (1986); S.
MICHAUD & H. AYNESWORTH, THE ONLY LIVING WITNESS (1983).
3
Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 312 S.E.2d 40 (1984); see also Deadman,
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testimony played a pivotal role in the trial of Jean Harris for the
murder of Dr. Tarnower, the Scarsdale Diet doctor.4 The forensic
analysis of physical evidence was "at the core of the case" against
Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald at Fort Bragg. 5 In addition, "fingerprint,
shoeprint, and ballistics evidence" was admitted in the "Night
Stalker'' serial murder prosecution. 6
More recent examples can be taken from the December 23,
1991, issue of Time magazine. One article on the assassination of
President Kennedy, sparked by the movie JFK, discussed the
"magic-bullet" theory-a theory which questioned whether the
same bullet could have struck both President John F. Kennedy and
Texas Governor John Connally. The article states that "[n]eutron
activation tests indicate that the fragments in Connally's wrist did
come from the bullet in question. "7
Another story in the same issue concerned the recent Florida
trial of William Kennedy Smith for rape. The article pointed out
that during the investigation, the victim "passed two polygraph
tests and a voice-stress analysis." 8 That article, however, neglected
to mention that most courts exclude polygraph evidence as
unreliable, and virtually every reported case on voice-stress
analysis has rejected it as invalid.9
Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams Trial (Part l), 53 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT
BuLL. 12 (Mar. 1983); Deadman, Fiber Evidence and the Wayne Williams Trial
(Conclusion), 53 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (May 1984).
4
People v. Harris, 84 A.D.2d 63, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1981), aft'd, 456 N.Y.2d
694, 442 N.E.2d 1205 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983). Eight pathologists
testified; 20% of the trial was devoted to cutaneous histology. See Ackerman, The
Physician as Expert Witness: Is Peer Review Needed?, I GENERICS 37, 52 (Dec.
1985) ("The role of cutaneous histology in the trial of Jean Harris and its
implications for medicine and the law in America should be of concern to the
community of physicians"); TIME, Mar. 1, 1982, at 90 ("At the trial of Jean Harris
last year [the expert] tried to persuade the jury-unsuccessfully-that blood
marks jibed with Harris's claim that the shooting of Dr. Herman Tarnower
occurred accidentally during a struggle"); see also S. ALEXANDER, VERY MucH A
LADY: THE UNToLD STORY oF JEAN HARRis AND DR. HERMAN TARNOWER (1983); J.
DAVID, SCARSDALE MURDER (1981).
5
J. McGINNiss, FATAL VISION 264 (1983). MacDonald was convicted for
killing his wife and two children. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1
(1982); United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1103 (1983); United States v. MacDonald, 779 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986).
6
Harris, Night Stalker Convicted of 13 Murders, U.P.I., Sept. 21, 1989.
7
Corliss, Who Killed J.F.K?, TIME, Dec. 23, 1991, at 68; see also Weisburg
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 492, 499-503 CD.D.C. 1977) (Freedom of
Information Act request for lab results on Kennedy assassination).
8
Booth, Palm Beach Trial: The Case That Was Not Heard, TIME, Dec. 23,
1991, at 38.
9
See P. GIANNELLI & lMwrNKELRIED, SciENTIFIC EVIDENCE, ch. 8 (1986).
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B. Lack of Scientific Evidence
Indeed, reliance on scientific proof has become so common
that its absence in a particular case becomes noteworthy. A 1990
news account of the Central Park jogger case commented, "Among
the defense's strongest points in attacking the prosecution's case
was the surprising absence of physical evidence-no weapons, no
blood stains, no strands of hair, no pieces of skin, no footprints link
any of the teenagers to the crimes."lO
Another illustration is the recent acquittal of El Sayyid
Nosair for the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of
the Jewish Defense League. Apparently, nobody saw the actual
shooting. Witnesses, however, saw the defendant with a gun in the
same room where the shooting occurred, heard at least one shot,
and saw the defendant run from the scene. When the defendant
was shot and apprehended nearby, a gun was found next to him.
All this occurred within minutes of the shooting. Most prosecutors
would consider this a powerful case. An alternate juror explained
the jury's reasoning as follows:
[Two shots were heard] but only one bullet was found
and it was not tested for hair, blood or other indications
that it had passed through the rabbi's neck, the fatal
wound.
. . . [T]he prosecution had offered no evidence of Mr.
Nosair's fingerprints on the gun, no paraffin tests that
might have shown Mr. Nosair fired it, and no evidence
showing the bullet's trajectories.1 1

C. Variety of Techniques
We are not only using scientific proof more, but also relying
on a wider variety of techniques. Neutron activation, atomic
absorption, electrophoretic blood testing, scanning electron microscopy, mass spectrometry, and gas chromatography are but a few of
the techniques now used in criminal prosecutions. Other examples
include sound spectrometry (voiceprints), psycholinguistics, remote
electromagnetic sensing, and horizontal gaze nystagmus. Even
fingerprint identification has moved into the high-tech age with
laser technology for visualizing latent prints and computers for far
more powerful searching capability. In addition, the last decade
10
Sherman, Technology Emotion Key in Jogger Case, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20,
1990, at 8; see also N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1990, at B4 ("The youths claimed not to
have penetrated the jogger, and there was no clear physical proof that they had").
11
McFadden, For Jurors, Evidence in Kahane Case Was Riddled With Gaps,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1991, at B1, col. 2.
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has seen an increased reliance on social science research-often
called syndrome evidence. For example, evidence of battered wife
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome now frequently is admitted at trial.

II. Reasons for This Development
Several factors may have contributed to this increased use of
scientific evidence.

A Research Funding
At one time, funding for forensic science research was
substantial. The creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) in 1968 undoubtedly played a significant
role. In the 1970's, the LEAA underwrote a number of research
projects designed to encourage the forensic application of scientific
knowledge; the admissibility of some techniques can be traced
directly to this research. Voiceprint analysis is ·the best example.l2
Other funded projects dealt with blood analysis, 13 blood flight
characteristics, 14 trace metal detection, 15 and polygraphy.16 Currently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is spending a
considerable amount of resources on the forensic application of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).

B. Supreme Court Influence
Several writers have found a different reason. They attribute
the expanded use of scientific evidence to Supreme Court decisions
of the 1960's, in which the Warren Court severely restricted the
acquisition of eviden<;e for criminal cases via traditional crimesolving techniques, such as interrogations and lineups.17 For
example, commentators have written "Miranda, Gideon, Escobedo,
12

NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JusTICE, VOICE
IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH _(1972) (submitted to LEAA by Michigan State Police)
[hereinafter VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH].
13

B. GULLIFORD, THE EXAMINATION AND TYPING OF BLOODSTAINS IN THE
CRIME LABoRATORY (1971).
14

NATIONAL INSTITUTE oF LAw ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JusTICE, TRAcE
METAL DETECTION TEcHNIQUE IN LAw ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 1970).
15

D. RAsKIN ET AL., VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DETECTION OF DECEPTION

(1978).
16Jd.
17
See

Kelley, Foreword to R. Fox & C. CUNNINGHAM, CRIME ScENE SEARCH
AND PHYsiCAL EVIDENCE HANDBOOK at iii (1973); Fong, Criminalistics and the
Prosecutor, in THE PRosECUTOR's DESKBOOK 547 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971).
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and several other cases of similar import, indirectly created an
entirely new approach to criminal investigation. This has been
particularly true with regard to the use and application of the
various forensic sciences ...."18 In 1972, an appellate judge wrote,
"In this day and age ... where recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court establish stringent guidelines in the investigative,
custodial and prosecutional areas a premium is placed upon the
development and use of scientific methods of crime detection."19
There is some suggestion in the Supreme Court's cases that
supports this view. For· example, in one case the Court wrote,
"Modern community living requires modern scientific methods of
crime detection lest the public go unprotected."2° In Escobedo the
Court wrote,
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and
modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement
which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses
than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation. 21
Interestingly, while the Court was erecting constitutional
bamers to the use of confessions and lineups, it was removing
Fourth and Fifth Amendment obstacles to the use of scientific
evidence. The most important case was Schmerber v. California. 2 2
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applied only to
testimonial evidence, and not to physical evidence. Therefore, the
police could extract blood from Schmerber for blood-alcohol analysis
without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege. This ruling also
meant that law enforcement officials could compel a suspect to
provide handwriting exemplars, fingerprints, and voice
exemplars-and now biological samples for DNA testing-without
running afoul of the Self-Incrilnination Clause.23
Several Fourth Amendment cases also had an impact on the
use of scientific evidence. In Warden v. Hayden2 4 the Supreme
Court overruled its prior cases, which had prohibited the seizure of
18

Fox et al., The Criminalistics Mission: A Comment, in LEGAL MEDICINE
1 (C. Wecht ed. 1972).
19 Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (concurring
opinion).
20 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
21 Escobedo v. illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
22 384 u.s. 757 (1966).
23 See P. GIANNELLI & E. lMwiN:KELRIED, supra note 9, ch. 2.
24
387 U.S. 294 (1967) (Brennan, J.).
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"mere evidence." Under the "mere evidence" rule, the police could
seize only contraband, instrumentalities of a crime, or fruits of a
crime. Most scientific evidence would have been "mere evidence"
and thereby excluded under this rule.
The Warren Court also was the first Court to sanction stopand-frisk procedures by the police. 25 Later, in Davis v. Mississippi,26 Justice Brennan suggested that the seizure of a person,
on less than probable cause, for the purpose of obtaining
fingerprints may not violate the Fourth Amendment under certain
circumstances.27 This dictum led to the adoption in a number of
jurisdictions of what are known as "nontestimonial identification"
procedures. Under these provisions, a suspect judicially may be
ordered to provide handwriting, voice, and fingerprint exemplarsand perhaps biological samples for DNA testing-based on
reasonable suspicion, rather than on probable cause.2s

C. The Technological Age
I am not sure, however, that either of these reasons-research
funding or Supreme Court decisions-explains fully the increased
use of scientific evidence. The answer may be more basic. That a
society so dependent on science and technology should turn to such
knowledge as a method of proof should not be very surprising. With
computer technology running our businesses, magnetic resonance
imaging aiding medicine, and the marvel of twentieth-century
technology-Nintendo-captivating our kids, no one sh_ould be very
surprised to see DNA evidence in the courtroom.

D. Reliability
In addition, it is the perceived reliability of scientific proof
that makes it so attractive and explains its increased use.
Fingerprints are simply more reliable than many eyewitness
identifications. Lawyers and juries know this. A 1974 survey of
25

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)
(noting the Dauis dictum).
27
Later cases by the Court also facilitated the use of scientific evidence. In
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19 (1973), the Court held that physical characteristics, such as handwriting and
the sound of a person's voice, fell outside the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court also held that the
compelled production of voice and handwriting exemplars pursuant to a grand
jury subpoena did not constitute a seizure of the person within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
28 P. GIANNELLI & E. IMwiNKELRIED, supra note 9, ch. 2.
26
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1363 judges and lawyers throughout the United States found that
"[s]eventy-five percent . . . stated that they believed judges accord
scientific evidence more credibility than other evidence, and 70
percent believed that juries also find scientific evidence more
credible."29 A more recent survey of jurors reported, "About one
quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were
presented with scientific evidence believed that had such evidence
been absent, they would have changed their verdicts from guilty to
not guilty."30

III. Novel Scientific Evidence
The first article that I wrote on scientific evidence concerned
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence-that is, scientificallybased evidence that had not yet been admitted in court.31 That
article critiqued the two major evidentiary tests on the issue. The
first test is based oil Frye u. United States3 2 and requires the basis
of expert testimony to be generally accepted by the scientific
community. Under this standard, it is not enough that a qualified
expert--or even several experts-testifies that a particular technique is valid. Frye imposes a special burden-"general acceptance"
in the field.
The alternative approach is what I have described as the
relevancy test, which can be traced to Professor McCormick. 33
Under this test, the evidence need not be "generally accepted." It
need only be relevant, which in this context means reliable. The
critical difference between these two tests is that Frye is more
conservative-something its detractors lament and its supporters
applaud.
This issue remains critical today in the DNA cases. A recent
Second Circuit opinion, United States u. Jakobetz,34 in January
1992, rejected the Frye test and admitted DNA. Interestingly, five
months earlier, the Fifth Circuit not only had reaffirmed Frye in
Christophersen u. Allied-Signal Corp.,35 but also had applied it in
29
M. SAKS & R. VAN DmzEND, THE UsE oF SciENTIFic EVIDENCE IN
LITIGATION 5-6 (1983).
30
Peterson et al., The Uses, and Effects of Forensic Science in the
Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 1730, 1748 (1987).
31
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
32
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33
C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 363-64 (1954).
34
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
35
939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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a civil case; this was a major expansion.36 A proposed amendment
to Federal Evidence Rule 702, which is presently under considera-

tion, would adopt a compromise position, requiring expert testimony to be based on information that is "reasonably reliable."
In my article, I criticized both tests; but then I proposed an
alternate, yet restrictive, test. In a criminal case, the prosecution
should be required to satisfy a high burden of proof when offering
novel scientific evidence. Some examples illustrate why.

A The Paraffin Test
The paraffin test is a gunshot residue (GSR) test designed to
detect the presence of nitrates on the hands of a person suspected
of firing a rifle or handgun. Nitrates come from smokeless
powder-the propellant in modern ammunition-and often are
deposited on the hand from the backblast of gases that escape
during discharge. Paraffin was used to remove the residues.
Knowing whether someone had recently fired a weapon is often
significant in suspected suicides, self-defense, and other cases.
The "paraffin test" first was introduced into this country in
the 1930's and was adopted quickly by law enforcement agencies. 37
A 1935 article in the F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin spoke of the
"current widespread use" of this test. 38 The first reported case
admitting evidence based on the paraffin test was decided in
1936, 39 and other cases followed this precedent. 40
The first comprehensive study of the paraffin test, however,
was not published until 1967-thirty years after the first court
case. 4 1 From that study, we learned that many common substances
other than gunshot residues contain nitrates. "(R]ust,' colored
fingernail polishes, residue from evaporated urine, soap and tap
water" all tested positive. 42 In short, the test was nonspecific.
36
1 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 853 (1977) ("The Frye
standard ... is rarely applied in civil litigation").
37
Matthews, The Paraffin Test, 102 AMERICAN RIFLEMAN 20 (1954).
38
Diphenylamine Test for Gun Powder, 4 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 5
(1935). Diphenylamine was the reagent used in the test.
39
Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936).
40
See P. GIANNELLI & E. !MwrnKELRIED, supra note 9, at 413 (listing cases).
41
An earlier but smaller study was published in 1955. Turkel & Lipman,
Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46 J. CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY &
PoLicE Sci. 281, 282 (1955).
42
Cowan & Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin Test," 12 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 19,
23 (1967).
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Why did so much time pass before conducting this study? Why
did courts continue to admit this evidence, even after the
publication of this study?

B. Voiceprints
My second example is voiceprint evidence, which confronted
the courts in the 1970's. A voiceprint was used to identify a
speaker's tape-recorded voice by means of sound spectrometry.
Voiceprint evidence was admitted readily after the publication of a
1972 Michigan State University study, which was funded by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. 4 3 In that study,
34,992 experimental trials, involving 250 male speakers and
twenty-nine examiners were conducted over a two-year period.
False identifications occurred in approximately six_ percent of the
trials that most closely resembled the forensic situation. The error ·
rate is reduced to approximately two percent if the trials in which
the examiners expressed "uncertainty" about their conclusions are
eliminated.
Dr. Oscar Tosi, who supervised this study, testified that the
error rate would be "negligible" in a real-life situation.44 Based on
this study, many courts admitted voiceprint evidence. Other courts
disagreed, and a war over admissibility was waged for most of the
decade. 4 5 In 1979, the National Academy of Sciences published its
report on the subject. The report raised significant doubts about
voiceprint identifications. One passage stated,
Estimates of error rates now available pertain to only a
few of the many combinations of conditions encountered
in real-life situations. These estimates do not constitute
a generally adequate basis for a judicial or legislative
body to use in making judgments concerning the
reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identification in forensic applications. 46
As with the paraffin test, the court cases came first and then the
independent scientific report followed.
43

VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH, supra note 12.
People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 78, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 713 (1974).
45
P. GIANNELLI & E. lMwiNKELRIED, supra note 9, at 322-23 (listing cases).
46
NATIONAL AcADEMY OF SciENCES, ON THE THEoRY AND PRACTICE OF
VOicE IDENTIFICATION 60 (1979).
44
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C. Hypnotically-Refreshed Testimony
In the 1980's, the major dispute involving the admissibility of
scientific evidence concerned the testimony of witnesses whose
memories had been refreshed by hypnosis. Finding the evidence
reliable, numerous courts admitted hypnotically-refreshed testimony.47 Some of these courts said that hypnosis was merely
another way to refresh memory. Other courts, however, rejected
this evidence, holding that its use is so fraught with danger that a
witness becomes incompetent once hypnotized. 48
In 1985, the American Medical Association issued a report
that seriously questioned the accuracy of this type of testimony.
The report stated,
Review of the scientific literature indicates that when
hypnosis is used to refresh recollection, one of the
following outcomes occurs: (1) hypnosis produces recollections that are not substantially different from nonhypnotic recollections; (2) it yields recollections that are more
inaccurate than nonhypnotic memory; or, most frequently, (3) it results in more information being
reported, but these recollections contain both accurate
and inaccurate details. When the third condition results,
the individual is less likely to be able to discriminate
between accurate and inaccurate recollections. There are
no data to support a fourth alternative, namely, that
hypnosis increases remembering of only accurate
information. 49
Again, the same pattern reappears. Long after the battle over
admissibility-had erupted in the courtroom, an independent group
of experts issued a report on the subject. Should not the report
come before the admission of the evidence?

IV. Reliability of Routine Procedures
Now I would like to turn to expert testimony based on
"routine" procedures.
47 See

P. GIANNELLI & E.

IMwrNKELRIED,

supra note 9, ch. 12 (listing cases).

4B[d.
49
American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific
Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918, 1921
(1985).
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A Fingerprints

AB illustrated by several fingerprint cases, even the most
basic techniques are subject to error. For example, in Imbler v.
Craven, 50 the expert failed to observe an exculpatory fingerprint in
a murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. In another
murder case, State v. Caldwell,51 the court wrote, "The fingerprint
expert's testimony was damning-and it was false."5 2

B. Firearms Identification

In February 1989, the Los Angeles Police arrested Rickey
Ross for the murder of three prostitutes. An expert who was the
head of the Department's Firearms Identification Division made a
positive identification after compari.llg the murder bullets and a
bullet fired from Ross's nine-millimeter Smith & Wesson. One of
the defense attorneys later admitted, "I suppose I was like the
average citizen. They said it was a match, I thought it was like a
fingerprint." 53 Based on the same evidence, however, a defense
expert reached the opposite conclusion-that is, Ross's gun could
not have fired the fatal bullets. Two independent experts came to
yet another conclusion-namely, insufficient evidence existed to
draw any conclusions. The case against Ross was dropped.
This was not the first time that the Los Angeles crime
laboratory had stumbled. A prior misidentification occurred in the
investigation of Sirhan Sirhan for the assassination of Bobby
Kennedy.
In [People v. Sirhan,] seven independent examiners were
appointed by the presiding judge of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County to reexamine the purported firearms
bullet comparison post trial. The examiners were
unanimous in their findings that the identification
testified to at the grand jury indictment and in the trial
were misrepresented in that the purported identification
of bullets lodged in victim Kennedy ... with Sirhan's gun
50
298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
51
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982).
52
/d. at 586; see also Starrs, A Miscue in Fingerprint Identification: Causes
and Concerns, 12 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 287 (1984).
53
Baker & Lieberman, Faulty Ballistics in Deputy's Arrest; Eagerness to
"Make" Gun Cited in LAPD Lab Error, L.A. TIMEs, May 22, 1989, at 1, col. 1;
Freed, LAPD Probing What Went Wrong With Ballistics Tests on Ross' Gun, LA.
TIMEs, May 16, 1989, at 26, col. 1.
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were nonexistent. In both of these cases discovery and
cross examination were lacking.54
In a third case, In re Kirschke,55 the firearms identification
ex1--ert made a conclusive identification. On appeal, the court
concluded that the expert had "negligently presented false
demonstrative evidence in support of his ballistics testimony."56

C. Proficiency Testing
Unfortunately, these cases do not represent isolated mistakes.
A limited, but nevertheless revealing, survey of lawyers and
scientists associated with the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences identified "competency'' as the most significant ethical
problem in the field. 57 Other problems considered significant in the
survey included "the failure of scientists to express both the
strengths and weaknesses of their data, giving opinions which
exceed the limits of their data, and a failure to remain objective in
their evaluation of evidence and delivery of testimony."58
Moreover, proficiency test results of many common laboratory
examinations are disturbing. Seventy-one percent of the crime
laboratories tested provided unacceptable results in a blood test,
51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5% erred in a
soil examination, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifications.59 A review of five handwriting comparison proficiency tests
showed that, at best, "[d]ocument examiners were correct 57% of
the time and incorrect 43% of the time."6° One of the authors of a
major proficiency test commented,
In spite of being a firm advocate of forensic science, I
must acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of
laboratories are not performing routine tests competently
. . . . The startling conclusions from that research led to
some efforts to improve conditions in the laboratories,
54
Bradford, Forensic Firearms Identification: Competence or Incompetence, 5
FoRUM 14 (1978).
55
53 Cal. App. 3d 405, 125 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820
(1976).
56
I d. at 408, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
57
Peterson & Murdock, Forensic Sciences Ethics: Developing an Integrated
System of Support and Enforcement, 34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 749, 751 (1989).
58
I d. at 752.
59
J. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABoRATORY PRoFICIENCY TEsTING RESEARCH
PROGRAM 251 (1978).
60
Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731, 748
(1989).
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Consequently, "[a]t present, forensic science is virtually
unregulated-with the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories
must meet higher standards to be allowed to diagnose strep throat
than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row."62
In a recent article on crime laboratories, Professor Jonkait
concluded,
All available information indicates that forensic
science laboratories perform poorly .... Current regulation
of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory system can
improve crime laboratories .... [F]orensic facilities should
at least be required to undergo mandatory, blind
proficiency testing, and the results of this testing should
be made public. 63
This information about the reliability of routine tests should
affect a number of legal issues-for example, (1) whether our
current rules on pretrial discovery are adequate, 64 and (2) whether
laboratory reports should be admitted into evidence in lieu of
expert testimony.65

V. Fraud, Perjury, and Misconduct
A Experts

In a number of cases, experts have gone beyond negligence.
For example, a surprising number of expert witnesses have lied
about their credentials.66 In one case, an FBI serologist testified
that he had a master's degree in science, "whereas in fact he never
61
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599,
645 (1984) (remarks of Professor Joseph Peterson). For a more detailed discussion
of proficiency testing, see Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in
Forensic Science, 34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 772, 775-78 (1989) (reviewing proficiency
testing results) ("Perhaps the major lessons to be drawn from this are that errors
are indeed made and that there is a wide range of interlaboratory variation").
62
Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505 (1989).
63
Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARv. J. L. &
TEcH. 109, 191 (1991).
64
See Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence. and DNA, 44
VAND. L. REv. 791 (1991).
65
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The
Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 671 (1988).
66
See Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science,
34 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 772 (1989) (listing other cases); Annotation, Perjury or
Wilfully False Testimony of Expert Witness as Basis for New Trial on Ground of
Newly Discovered Evidence, 38 A.L.R.3d 812 (1971).
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attained a graduate degree."67 In another case, the death penalty
was vacated when evidence was discovered that a prosecution
expert, who ''had testified in many cases," had lied about her
professional qualifications. "[S]he had never fulfilled the educational requirements for a laboratory technician."68 Other examples
include a serologist who testified falsely about his academic
credentials;69 a psychologist who was convicted of pe:tjury for
claiming, during the Ted Bundy trial, that he had a doctorate
degree;7o an arson expert who testified falsely about his academic
credentials; 71 a lab technician convicted of peijury for misrepresenting his educational background;72 and a lab analyst who
pleaded guilty to eight counts of falsification for misstating his
academic credentials. 73
Perhaps the most striking illustration is a firearms expert
who took some credit for "the development of penicillin, the 'Pap'
smear, and to top it all off, the atomic bomb."7 4 Professor Starrs,
who has examined these cases in depth, has proposed discovery as
the remedy for this type of fraud.75
Another type of misconduct is illustrated by the ''Maguire
Case" in Great Britain. The Maguires were accused of possessing
an explosive as part of the Irish Republican Army's terrorism
campaign. The prosecution relied on scientific evidence. Professor
Starrs has provided us with the following summary:
The government built its case on the traces of [nitroglycerine] under the fingernails of six of the defendants
and on the plastic gloves belonging to Mrs. Maguire.
"The evidence was almost entirely scientific." . . . The
prosecution made much of the fact that [thin layer
chromatography] will identify [nitroglycerine] to the
exclusion of other substances, explosive and nonexplosive. The tests were said to be as conclusive and
irrefutable as fingerprints. The entire underpinnings for
67
Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449, 460 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1037 (1981).
68
Commonwealth v. Mount, 435 Pa. 419, 422, 257 A.2d 578, 579 (1969).
69
Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1062 (2d Cir. 1987).
70
Kline v. State, 444 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
71
People v. Alfano, 95 III. App. 3d 1026, 1028-29, 420 N.E.2d 1114, 1116
(1983).
72
State v. Elder, 199 Kan. 607, 433 P.2d 462 (1967).
73
State v. DeFronzo, 59 Ohio Misc. 113, 116, 394 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (C.P.
1978).
74
Starrs, Mountebanks Among Forensic Scientists, in 2 FoRENSIC SciENCE
IlANDBooK 1, 7, 20-29 (R. Saferstein ed. 1988).
75
/d. at 31.
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this assertion was proved not only to be scientifically
false but also known to be so by all concerned parties
and scientists by the trial's eleventh hour discovery of an
intra-Dab] memorandum dated six months prior to the
Maguires' arrest. 76
Another example occurred in 1970, when a federal grand jury
in Chicago investigated the deaths of Black Panther leaders in a
police raid. The grand jury report noted that the "testimony of the
firearms examiner that he could not have refused to sign what he
believed was an inadequate and preliminary report on pain of
potential discharge is highly alarming. If true, it could undermine
public confidence in all scientific analysis performed by this
agency."7 7

B. Attorneys
Attorneys also have misused expert and scientific evidence.
Perhaps the most flagrant abuse was the prosecutor in Miller v.
Pate. 7 B A prosecution expert had testified that stains on underwear
shorts were type-A blood, which matched the defendant's blood
type. The prosecutor waived the ''bloody'' shorts in front of the jury
in closing argument. Later proceedings established that the stains
were paint-not blood-and that the prosecutor knew this fact at
the time of trial.
Another type of prosecutorial misconduct involves improper
attempts to pressure experts into changing or modifying their
opinions. In a recent case involving a federal grand jury, the
Supreme Court noted that the "District Court further concluded
that one of the prosecutors improperly argued with an expert
witness during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave
testimony adverse to the government."79
A different type of misconduct is illustrated by the controversial Sacco and Vanzetti case. Sacco and V anzetti were charged with
murder during a payroll robbery in 1921. Many believe their
executions resulted more from their foreign statuses and "radical"
beliefs than from the cogency of the evidence presented against
76
Starrs, The Forensic Scientist and the Open Mind, 31 J. FoRENSIC Sci.
Soc'y 111, 141-42 (1991) (citing May et al., Interim Report on the Maguire Case,
London: HMSO (12 July 1990)).
77
Bradford, Problems of Ethics and Behavior in the Forensic Sciences, 21 J.
FoRENSIC Sci. 763, 767 (1976) (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill., E. Div., Report of
January 1970 Grand Jury 121).
78
386 u.s. 1 (1967).
79
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
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them. Firearms identification evidence was critical. Professor
Morgan has commented on this issue.
On October 23 Captain Proctor made an affidavit
indicating that he had repeatedly told [the prosecutor]
that he would have to answer in the negative if he were
asked whether he had found positive evidence that the
fatal bullet had been fired from Sacco's pistol. The
statement which Proctor made on the witness stand was:
''My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by
that pistol."BO

If this passage is true, then the prosecution intentionally misled
the jury.

VI. Problem Areas
In researching scientific evidence issues, a number of
recurring problems have tended to surface. I will mention several
such issues, though I am sure more exist.

A. Technology Transfer
One of the attacks on DNA evidence has focused on the issue
of "technology transfer"-that is, DNA has been used in scientific
research for a number of purposes, but not for the purpose for
which it is being used in criminal trials. The argument is quite
simple. Specifically, just because DNA is valid for some purposes
does not necessarily mean that it is valid for a different purpose.
This is a recurring issue in the forensic sciences. For example,
the American Medical Association had recognized hypnosis as an
accepted medical technique for psychotherapy, treatment of
psychosomatic illnesses, and amnesia. 8 1 In this context, hypnosis
can be "therapeutically useful, [and yet] it need not produce
historically accurate memory."B 2 The use of hypnosis to refresh
recollection at trial is a very different thing because its use
depends on whether it can produce accurate memory.
Similarly, the initial research on rape trauma syndrome was
developed to aid rape victims. "[R]ape trauma syndrome was not
devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular past
event-i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense occurred80 L. JouGHIN

& E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANZE'ITI 15 (1948).
Council on Mental Health, Medial Use of Hypnosis, 168 JAMA 186 (1958).
82
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
81
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but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a
therapeutic tool, to help identifY, predict and treat emotional
problems experienced by the counselor's clients or patients."B3
This research still, however, may be useful in a criminal trial.
Rape trauma syndrome evidence may be helpful if the defendant
suggests to the jury that the conduct of the victim after the
incident-such as a delay in reporting the assault-is inconsistent
with the claim of rape. In this situation, "expert testimony on rape
trauma syndrome may play a particularly useful role by disabusing
the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape
victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of . . . popular
myths."84

B. Subjectivity
A number of routine forensic techniques are essentially
subjective. Firearms identification is an example. Even though
based on objective data-such as striation marks on a bullet-the
conclusion about a match comes down to the examiner's subjective
judgment. Questioned documents, bite marks, and even fingerprints fall into the same category.
Subjectivity also may be a problem when instrumentation is
used. For example, the polygraph technique-although employing
an instrument-involves a large dose of subjectivity. Indeed, some
courts have rejected polygraph results because of this factor.
According to one court, the polygraph technique "albeit based on a
scientific theory, remains an art with unusual responsibility placed
on the examiner."B5 Another court spoke of the "almost total
subjectiveness surrounding the use of the polygraph and the
interpretation of the results."B6 The use of DNA evidence also
involves subjectivity if a "match" is declared based only on "eyeballing'' the autorads. 87
I do not equate "subjective" with ''bad" or "invalid." As I noted
before, fingerprints are-in this sense-subjective, but they are
also very reliable. Subjectivity, however, necessarily means that
83
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-50, 681 P.2d 291, 300, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 450, 459 (1984).
84
ld. at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
85
People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 360 (Colo. 1981).
86
People v. Monigan, 72 ill. App. 3d 87, 98, 390 N.E.2d 562, 569 (1979).
87
See Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 88 (1989) ("There are currently no
formal standards for determining what constitutes a match between two DNA
prints. Whether a match is declared between two prints is a subjective judgment
for the forensic expert").

184

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 137

room for disagreement exists-specifically, the greater the subjectivity, the greater the chance for error.

C. Statistical Evidence
In contrast to the "subjective" techniques, a number of
techniques are based upon statistics. As one commentator has
noted, "The results of forensic tests are often meaningful only if
they are accompanied by statistical data."ss Neutron activation,
electrophoretic blood testing, and DNA are examples.
Often, this type of evidence can be misused. If, for example,
the expert testifies that the perpetrator and the defendant share a
blood type found in five percent of the population, a juror might
conclude that a ninety-five-percent chance exists that the defendant is guilty. 89 Such a conclusion would not be warranted. If a
million people lived in the city where the crime occurred, 50,000
people would share this blood type. Can the defense then argue
that the probability of guilt is therefore one in 50,000? This is also
misleading. 90
These are relatively easy issues compared to the problems
with DNA evidence, over which some scientists argue that the loci
used in the analysis have not been proved to be independent. If
they are not independent, then the product rule cannot be used to
compute an overall probability.
Let me simply conclude first by saying that lawyers must
understand probabilistic reasoning, and second by citing an article
by Professor McCord, entitled "A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence in Criminal
Cases: People u. Collins and Beyond."91

D. Misleading and Ambiguous Conclusions
Pay close attention to an expert's conclusion. As mentioned
earlier, the firearms identification expert in the Sacco and Vanzetti
case testified that the bullet was "consistent with" having been
fired by Sacco's gun. Apparently, the defense counsel and judge
88
Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 9 (1989).
89
Id. at 25.
90
Id. at 31.
91
McCord, A Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical
Evidence in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 WABH. & LEE L.
REv. 741 (1990); see also Mark & Workman, Pitfalls of Statistics, Part I, 6
SPECTROSCOPY 42 (1991).
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believed that a positive identification was being made. It was not.
Hundreds or thousands of weapons may have fired that bullet.
Experts in the neutron activation cases have testified that (1)
samples "were of the same type and same manufacture";92 (2) hair
samples "came from the same source";93 (3) blood analysis revealed
a "match of the materials";9 4 (4) samples had a "common origin or
source";95 and (5) hair samples "were identical and probably came
from the same person."96 What does this testimony mean? Might
not a jury believe that a positive identification is being made?

E. Destruction of Evidence and Chain of Custody
In researching cases on chain of custody issues, I came across
a surprising number of cases in which evidence was lost or
destroyed. A review of the cases reveals that drugs, bullets, blood,
urine, and trace metal detection results, as well as physical
evidence of arson, rape, and homicide, have not been preserved for
examination or retesting. 97
Perhaps the most bizarre illustration is People v. Morgan,9B in
which a severed fingertip was found at the scene of a homicide. It
was not the victim's. Through insightful police work-that is,
looking for someone with a missing fingertip--Morgan sans
fingertip became a suspect. The defense moved pretrial to examine
the fingertip. The fingertip, however, could not be located.
Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the prosecution
could not use the fingertip evidence at trial. The court does not tell
us what happened, but a news report does. The refrigerator in
which the evidence was stored apparently was not cold enough to
prevent decay and the police refused to move the fingertip to the
refrigerator in which they stored their ''brown bag lunches."
Accordingly, "someone-the police haven't been able to determine
who-threw the fingertip away."99
92
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
994 (1971).
93
People v. Collins, 43 Mich. App. 259, 264, 204 N.W.2d 290, 293 (1972).
94
State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 368 (Mo. 1972).
95
State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403, 421, 260 A2d 547, 560 (1969), rev'd on
other grounds, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
96
Ward v. State, 427 S.W.2d 876, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
97 See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMwiNKELRIED, supra note 9, at 108-09 (collecting
cases).
9
a 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980).
99
Moya, The Case of the Missing Fingertip, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1981, at 11.
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VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, let me make two points. First, despite my
criticisms today about how scientific evidence often is misused in
the courtroom, I am a strong proponent of scientific proof. It is
often better than eyewitness testimQny and credibility battles-the
''he said, she said" testimony often encountered in rape trials.
Moreover, an innocent person may · be exonerated because of
scientific evidence.
Second, problems with experts are not new. In 1843, an
English judge wrote that "skilled witnesses come with such a bias
in their minds to support the case in which they are embarked that
hardly any weight should be given to their evidence."loo In 1899,
the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "[t]here is hardly
anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be
proved by some so-called 'expert."' 101
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